For the twentieth time in this war, a Northern general was
outmanoeuvred and beaten, simply because his adversary--understanding
how to husband an inferior strength--seized the right moment for
bringing it into play.
I do not mean to assert that the Confederates invariably advance in
column, or to advocate this especial mode of attack: a successful
outflanking of the enemy may turn out an advantage not less decided than
the breaking of his centre; but, when half-disciplined troops are to be
handled, concentrative movements must surely be safer than extensive
ones. It would be well to remember that, among all the trained
battalions of Europe, our own crack regiments are supposed to be the
only ones that can be thoroughly relied on for attacking in line.
If Hooker thought himself strong enough to cross the rear of Lee's army,
and cut him off from Richmond, while a combined movement against the
city was being executed by Dix and Keyes from the southeast, the delay
of forty hours, during which he advanced about six miles, can scarcely
be excused, or even accounted for. That the wary foe should be taken
entirely by surprise, was a contingency too improbable to be calculated
on by any sane tactician, however sanguine.
To dispense almost entirely with the aid of the cavalry arm, on the eve
of a general engagement, was certainly a bold stroke of strategy--too
bold to be justified by any independent successes likely to be achieved
by the detachment.
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